The Long Journey Home: \u3cem\u3eCeuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas\u3c/em\u3e and the Importance of Meaningful Judicial Review in Protecting Immigrant Rights by Brown, Kaitlin J.
  
1 
THE LONG JOURNEY HOME: CUELLAR DE 
OSORIO v. MAYORKAS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN PROTECTING IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS 
KAITLIN J. BROWN* 
Abstract: In Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit extended the Child Status Protection Act’s (“CSPA”) protections to 
all children who age out during the extended process of obtaining a visa as a 
child derivative beneficiary. In so holding, the court overturned a precedential 
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In its review of the BIA’s 
decision, the Ninth Circuit applied the two-step test from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the seminal case in administrative law 
for review of executive agency action. The court exercised a rigorous review in 
step one of the test, and held that the CSPA unambiguously grants broad protec-
tion to all aged-out children. In exercising its constitutional power to say “what 
the law is,” the court protected immigrant families by ensuring the executive 
agency executes the law accurately and fully, as passed by Congress. As the Su-
preme Court of the United States considers this case, it should uphold the Ninth 
Circuit to ensure that the unambiguous protection granted by Congress to all 
children will be properly implemented by the United States Citizenship and Im-
migration Services. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellants Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio, Teresita Costelo, and Lorenzo 
Ong petitioned for visas to enter the United States along with their minor chil-
dren.1 As a result, the appellants were granted family-based visas and became 
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 1 See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) (No. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013). Petitioners argued that Congress 
introduced ambiguity to the statute by using the term of art, “automatic conversion,” in a context that 
does not support the understood meaning of the term. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 16, 
Cuellar de Osorio, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (No. 12-930). Respondents argued that a plain reading of the text 
provides an unambiguous meaning, and that under traditional rules of statutory construction, the stat-
ute clearly extends its protections to the universe of petitioners described in subsection (h)(1), which 
is extended to all derivative beneficiaries. See id. at 28–30. In addition to briefs from Respondents and 
Petitioners, former Members of Congress, who were present at passage of the Child Status Protection 
Act (“CSPA”), submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to hold that the statute unambiguously 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:E. Supp. 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs).2 Their children, however, had aged out of 
eligibility for their derivative visas by the time they became available because 
of backlogs in processing and quota lines.3 Relying on the Child Status Protec-
tion Act (“CSPA”), appellants asked the United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services (“USCIS”) to convert their children’s petitions to adult visa 
petitions and to place them at the front of the adult visa line.4 USCIS denied 
the request, stating that the CSPA’s statutory language did not apply to the ap-
pellants’ children because the CSPA did not cover their visa types.5 As a result, 
the appellants’ children would have to restart the entire visa process, and spend 
many more years waiting for their adult visas.6 
The appellants sued the U.S. government, arguing their children should be 
afforded all protections under the CSPA, including automatic conversion of 
their derivative visa petitions to adult petitions and retention of their parents’ 
original filing date.7 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia, deferring to an earlier decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”), granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment in both 
lower court cases.8 Cuellar de Osorio, Costelo, and Ong appealed to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where their separate cases were joined.9 
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard the initial appeal and affirmed 
district court’s decision.10 
                                                                                                                           
covers all derivative beneficiaries, as that was the unanimous and bipartisan intent of Congress at the 
time. See Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respond-
ents at 8–10, Cuellar de Osorio, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (No. 12-930). 
 2 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. 
 3 See id. at 1007, 1010. 
 4 See Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1158 (2012); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 
1010. 
 5 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1009–10. 
 6 See id. at 1010. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Zhang v. Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (deferring to the BIA 
and rejecting the plaintiffs’ appeal), aff’d sub nom., Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954 (9th 
Cir. 2011), and rev’d en banc, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) 
(no. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013); Costelo v. Chertoff, No. SA08-00688-JVS(SHx), 2009 WL 
4030516, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (deferring to the BIA and rejecting plaintiffs’ appeal), aff’d 
sub nom., 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011), and rev’d en banc, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013). The Appellants in Cuellar de Osorio were parties to two separate lower 
court cases on the same issue of whether their children should retain their priority date on their new, 
adult visa petitions. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 957. The district court held in both cases that 
the BIA’s decision in In re Wang was entitled to deference and therefore controlling on this issue. 
Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. Accordingly, the district court granted the Government’s motion 
for summary judgment in each case. Id. The cases were later combined upon appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 957. 
 9 See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 957. 
 10 See id. at 955–57. 
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Upon a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that the plain language 
of the CSPA unambiguously grants automatic conversion and priority date re-
tention to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries of family-based visa petitions.11 
The court applied the well-worn two-step analysis from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to determine whether it was proper 
to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute.12 Writing for the majority, 
Judge Mary H. Murguia held that the statute unambiguously extends its protec-
tion to all children who apply as derivative beneficiaries.13 Therefore, the 
BIA’s interpretation was not entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine, 
and there was no need for the court to move to step two of the analysis.14 
The court’s willingness to undertake a rigorous inquiry at step one of the 
Chevron analysis is critical to the defense of this highly complex legislation.15 
Judge Murguia’s decision relied on plain-language interpretation, in conjunc-
tion with statutory construction analysis, and exemplifies how courts should 
review agency interpretations of complex law and policy.16 Robust judicial 
review provides a critical check on agencies that may be resistant to imple-
mentation of new policy, or that may seek to undermine hard-won legislation 
through improper implementation, particularly in the highly complex and po-
litically-charged area of immigration.17 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d. at 1006. 
 12 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); 
Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011. Chevron set up a two-step test for judicial review of executive 
agency action. 467 U.S. at 842–43. Since that decision, that test has been extensively relied upon to de-
fine the relationship between the executive branch’s power to interpret and implement laws according to 
agency expertise, and the judicial branch’s power to interpret the scope and meaning of a law. See gener-
ally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991); Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26 (1990). Under the Chev-
ron test, a court engaged in review of action taken by an executive agency pursuant to the statute that the 
agency administers determines whether the statute is clear or ambiguous by asking whether Congress 
“has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If the court finds 
Congress has spoken clearly, it applies the plain meaning of the law to the facts of case and does not 
move on to step two. Id. If the court finds the statute to be ambiguous, it moves to step two of the analy-
sis to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous statute is “based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 
 13 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012. 
 14 See id. at 1015–16. 
 15 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527–28 (stating that “[a]ggressive [judicial] review serves as a powerful ex 
ante deterrent to lawless or irrational agency behavior.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Defer-
ence to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994, 996–97 (1992) (suggesting that the only effec-
tive institutional mechanism for checking the power of executive agencies is judicial review). 
 16 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1013–14; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 527. 
 17 See Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. the Political Branches: Immigration “Reform” and the Battle 
for the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512 (2007) (describing how the 
judiciary pushes back against anti-immigrant legislation or administrative action through meaningful 
judicial review); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 527–28. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States should uphold the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit.18 Any other outcome would award enormous deference to the 
BIA and set a precedent delegating both legislative and judicial powers to ex-
ecutive agencies, even in the face of clear and contrary congressional intent.19 
Such precedent would endanger any future attempt by Congress to afford im-
migrant families new rights and protections.20 
I. DENIAL OF CHILDREN’S VISAS 
Appellants Cuellar de Osorio, Costelo, and Ong were the primary benefi-
ciaries of family-sponsored visa petitions for entry into the United States.21 
The issue in this case involves the appellants’ now adult children.22 Appellants 
listed their minor children as derivative beneficiaries on their petitions, mean-
ing that the children would receive visas for entry upon approval and issuance 
of their parents’ visas.23 The appellants’ visa petitions were approved and they 
and their children, who were under twenty-one at the time, were placed in line 
to receive a visa.24 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Brief for Respondents at 15–16, Cuellar de Osorio, 133 S. Ct. 2853, (No. 12-930) (arguing that 
Congress unambiguously answered the question at issue, standard statutory interpretation reveals the 
unambiguous intent of Congress, and any contrary interpretation by the BIA is arbitrary and capri-
cious). 
 19 See id. at 18; see also Slocum, supra note 17, at 514 (administrative agencies have tried cir-
cumventing robust judicial review to the detriment of immigrant rights). 
 20 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 55–56 (contending that the Court should not allow 
the BIA to circumvent the will of Congress because it disagrees with it). 
 21 See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) (No. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013). To come to the United States an 
alien must have a visa. See id. at 1006. In order to acquire a visa, an eligible party must petition on 
behalf of the alien. Id. Often this is a family member that is already either a U.S. citizen or an LPR. Id. 
Those types of petitions are called family-sponsored petitions. Id. In any family-sponsored visa peti-
tion, the alien named on the petition is called the “primary beneficiary.” Id. at 1007. 
 22 See id. at 1006. 
 23 See Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2012) (“A spouse or child . . . shall . . . be 
entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, 
if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.”); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1007, 
1010. If the primary beneficiary has a child under the age of twenty-one upon filing the petition, the 
primary beneficiary-parent may ask that the child also receive a visa when the parent does. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(d); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1007, 1010. The child’s visa petition is called a derivate 
visa petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1007, 1010. 
 24 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1007, 1010. Once a visa petition has been submitted, 
USCIS reviews the petition. See id. at 1010. Appellants’ petitions were approved, meaning they were 
cleared for entry on the merits of their respective petitions, however, due to quotas and a backlog of 
petitions, visas for appellants were not immediately available. Id. at 1006. The process of waiting for a 
visa once approved is often referred to as being “in line.” Id. at 1007. An alien’s place in line is de-
termined by the date his or her petition was originally submitted, this is called the priority date. Id. An 
alien will get a visa after everyone with an earlier priority date has received a visa. Id. This process 
can take years. See id. at 1007. 
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Due to statutory annual limits on the number of visas issued in each cate-
gory, there is a substantial backlog in the number of aliens approved for entry, 
but who are still waiting for visas.25 In this case Ms. Cuellar de Osorio waited 
seven years between filing her petition and receiving a visa, Ms. Costelo wait-
ed fourteen years, and Mr. Ong waited twenty-one years to receive his visa.26 
As a result of this extended waiting period, the appellants’ children were over 
twenty-one by the time the visas became available, and had thus aged out of 
eligibility for child derivative visas.27 After receiving their visas, the appellants 
filed adult visa petitions on behalf of their children and, relying on the CSPA, 
asked USCIS to retain their original filing dates (known as priority dates).28 
USCIS denied their requests and placed their children at the end of the line for 
adult visas, thereby effectively requiring them to begin the entire immigration 
process over again.29 
Congress passed the CSPA in 2002 for the purpose of protecting children 
of immigrating families from aging out of eligibility before their visas became 
available, a common occurrence due to the length of the visa process.30 The 
CSPA prevents children, whose parents had previously included them on their 
visa petitions, from having to reapply for adult visas if they age out during the 
waiting period.31 The specific provision at issue in Cuellar de Osorio v. 
Mayorkas is subsection (h)(3) of the CSPA, which provides that aliens who are 
determined to be over twenty-one years old by the time their visa becomes 
available shall have their petitions automatically converted to adult petitions 
and shall retain their original priority date from the original petition filed with 
their parents.32 The question addressed by the court in this case is whether this 
provision applies to a subset of visa petitions, or to all derivative visa peti-
tions.33 
Following USCIS’s denial of their request, appellants filed suit against 
USCIS in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.34 They 
argued that section (h)(3) of the CSPA applies to all child derivative visas, in-
cluding their own children.35 In its decision, the district court deferred to the 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 1010. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. at 1007–08. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 
1008. 
 33 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1009. 
 34 Id. at 1010. 
 35 See id. Subsection (h)(3) states: 
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BIA’s previous decision in the 2009 case, In re Wang, and granted the Gov-
ernment’s motion for summary judgment.36 The BIA in In re Wang held that 
the CSPA affords the benefits of (h)(3) to a narrow subsection of petitions, 
which did not include the appellants’ children.37 
Cuellar de Osorio, Costelo, and Ong appealed the district court’s decision 
to the Ninth Circuit, contending that the district court was wrong to defer to the 
BIA’s interpretation.38 They argued that the statute unambiguously grants its 
protection to all child derivative visa petitions, and further alleged that the 
BIA’s interpretation of the language of the CSPA was not based on a reasona-
ble construction of the statute.39 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, holding the statutory language to be ambiguous and the BIA’s inter-
pretation to be reasonable.40 
At a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary 
judgment under a de novo standard of review.41 The court reversed the district 
court’s decision in an opinion written by Judge Murguia.42 The majority held 
the language of the statute to be unambiguous, and therefore the BIA’s inter-
pretation was not entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.43 Judge Murguia used traditional tools of 
statutory construction to find that subsection (h)(3) applied to all child deriva-
tive beneficiaries because it uses identical language to subsection (h)(1), which 
was well established as applying to all child derivative beneficiaries.44 
                                                                                                                           
Retention of priority date. If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 
21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, 
the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the 
alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition. 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3). 
 36 Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. 
 37 See id. at 1009 (citing In re Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2009)). In In re Wang, the BIA 
determined that the statutory language of the CSPA limits the benefits of automatic conversion to an 
adult visa and retention of the priority date to F2A petitions, which would not include the appellants’ 
children. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Wang, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. at 38–39. In re Wang presented a case of first impression and is the precedential decision that 
the court is reviewing in Cuellar de Osorio. See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011; In re Wang, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. at 38–39. 
 38 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1006; Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, 36, 
Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d 1003 (No. 09-56786). 
 39 Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 38, at 19, 36. 
 40 See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 955, 965–66; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that when statutory language speaks clearly 
to the intent of Congress, the plain meaning of the language is controlling over an agency’s interpreta-
tion). 
 41 Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011. 
 42 Id. at 1006. 
 43 See id. at 1015. 
 44 See id. Subsection (h)(1) states: 
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II. APPLICATION OF THE CHEVRON TEST PRECLUDES ANY DEFERENCE TO 
THE BIA’S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
In its review of the BIA’s determination that subsection (h)(3) applies to 
only a subset of child derivative visas, the Ninth Circuit applied the Chevron 
two-step analysis.45 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. was decided by the Supreme Court in 1984 to determine whether regu-
lations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were a 
valid implementation of the Clean Air Act.46 The Court held that the EPA was 
entitled to deference in its interpretation because the statute was ambiguous.47 
Consequently, the Chevron decision set up a two-part test that has since been 
used by courts to review executive agency action taken pursuant to the statute 
it administers.48 
When analyzing a statute under Chevron, a court must first determine 
whether the language of the statute is clear or ambiguous.49 If the language of 
the statute is clear, Chevron dictates that its plain meaning controls and re-
quires the court to apply that meaning directly to the facts of the case.50 In the 
alternative, if the wording of the statute is ambiguous, Chevron states that the 
court should defer to the executive agency’s interpretation, provided that it is 
based on a reasonable construction of the statute.51 The Court reasoned that, 
                                                                                                                           
(1) In general: For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, a determi-
nation of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in the matter preceding subpar-
agraph (A) of section 1101(b)(1) of this title shall be made using— (A) [formula de-
scribed] . . . (B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition 
described in paragraph (2) was pending.” 
Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Subsection (h)(2) states: 
(2) Petitions described: The petition described in this paragraph is— (A) with respect to 
a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, a petition filed under 
section 1154 of this title for classification of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) 
of this section; or (B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary un-
der subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for 
classification of the alien’s parent under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
Id. 
 45 See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) (No. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013). 
 46 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
 47 See id. at 844–45. 
 48 See id. at 842–43; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); 
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991); Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 
U.S. 26 (1990). 
 49 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. at 843. 
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where Congress is silent or ambiguous as to its intent in the statute, it has pur-
posefully left interpretation to the expert agencies.52 
The Ninth Circuit en banc majority in Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas ap-
plied traditional tools of statutory interpretation and found the plain language 
of the CSPA to be unambiguous.53 The majority held that the language of sub-
section (h)(3) is dependent on the other two subsections and so it must apply to 
all aged-out family-based visa petitions as described in subsection (h)(2).54 
Judge Murguia began her discussion by examining the plain language of 
section (h) of the CSPA.55 She acknowledged that the subsection at issue, 
(h)(3), does not itself list the visa types to which it applies.56 The judge, how-
ever, rejected the Government’s contention that this observation should be the 
extent of the court’s inquiry into the ambiguity of the statutory language.57 In-
stead, the court read the subsection in its full statutory context.58 
By reading the statutory language in context, the court concluded that 
subsection (h)(3) only has effect because it relies on the formula laid out in 
subsection (h)(1), which explicitly applies to the visas described in subsection 
(h)(2).59 In her reasoning, Judge Murguia showed that subsection (h)(3) is the 
third leg of a three-part section that works together to provide comprehensive 
instructions for how to deal with children who have aged out during the wait-
ing period.60 Based on this analysis, the majority concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the statute requires that the protections laid out in subsection (h)(3) 
apply to appellants’ children, and all other derivative beneficiaries because 
they are included under subsection (h)(2).61 
Judge Murguia did not, however, end her analysis with this holding.62 She 
went on to “bolster” the majority’s interpretation by looking at rules of statuto-
ry construction.63 She noted the repeated use of the phrase “for [the] purposes 
of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d)” within subsections (h)(1) and (h)(3).64 Apply-
ing the presumption that identical language within the same statutory provision 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 844, 865. 
 53 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011–12. Although the three-judge panel found the lan-
guage to be ambiguous, it deferred to the BIA’s interpretation because not adopting the BIA’s inter-
pretation would lead to impracticable results. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 961–
62 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 54 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012. 
 55 See id. at 1011; see also Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 961. 
 56 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011. 
 57 See id. at 1012. 
 58 See id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. 
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carries the same meaning, she concluded that where the initial use of the lan-
guage in subsection (h)(1) unambiguously means that it applies to any child 
derivative visa, the subsequent use of that identical phrase in subsection (h)(3) 
must necessarily retain that same meaning.65 The majority held that this repeti-
tion extends the protection of automatic conversion and priority date retention 
given in subsection (h)(3) to all child derivative visas.66 Having discerned a 
clear meaning from the statutory text, the court did not need to move on to step 
two of the Chevron test to address the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpreta-
tion.67 The court reversed the three-judge panel, holding that the CSPA unam-
biguously extends automatic conversion and retention of priority date to all 
derivate beneficiaries.68 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF A RIGOROUS CHEVRON STEP ONE IN PROTECTING 
THE RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 
Judge Murguia conducted an in-depth analysis of the statutory language 
to conclusively hold that the provision of the CSPA at issue was unambigu-
ous.69 There is some disagreement among courts as to whether the first step in 
a Chevron analysis should entail a limited reading of the isolated language at 
issue, or whether it should involve a more in-depth inquiry.70 Indeed, the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (holding there is a presumption that a 
given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute)); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at 36 (hold-
ing statutory interpretation is not guided by a single sentence, but rather undertaken in the context of 
the statute as a whole). 
 66 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012. 
 67 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the mat-
ter  . . . .”); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1015. The Fifth and Second Circuits have similarly found 
that the statutory language of the CSPA is unambiguous in their analyses under step one of the Chev-
ron step test. See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010 (citing Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 374 
(5th Cir. 2011) and Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 382–83 (2d Cir. 2011)). Similarly to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Fifth Circuit held that the language unambiguously covers all family-based derivative benefi-
ciaries. See Khalid, 655 F.3d at 374. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the language unam-
biguously applies only to a narrow subset of derivative beneficiaries. Li, 654 F.3d at 382–83. The 
Second Circuit did not consider the interrelatedness of subsections (h)(1)–(3) in its analysis. See id. It 
found that a broad reading of the statute, as the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted it, would 
create a conflict with the previous visa system of categories. See id. at 385; see also Cuellar de 
Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1018; Khalid, 655 F.3d at 374. Based on this conflict, the Ninth Circuit held the 
meaning of the text unambiguously creates narrow benefits to fit within the old framework. Cuellar de 
Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1018. Judge Murguia rejected the Second Circuit’s reading based on principles of 
statutory construction described above. See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1014; Li, 654 F.3d at 385. 
The dissent in Cuellar de Osorio touched on this circuit split, suggesting such disagreement among 
the circuits may lend credence to those that argue that the language is ambiguous, but is not disposi-
tive of statutory ambiguity. See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1016 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 68 Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1015–16. 
 69 See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) (No. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013). 
 70 Compare Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (“Judicial deference to 
agency . . . reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches . . . the resolu-
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trict court in Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas conducted a much less rigorous 
inquiry into the statutory language.71 Finding it to be ambiguous when read in 
isolation, the district court subsequently deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of 
the statute’s true meaning.72 In so holding, the district court afforded deference 
to the executive agency in determining which rights are embodied in this com-
plex legislation.73 On appeal, Judge Murguia was evidently unwilling to cede 
this role to the BIA.74 
In addition, Judge Murguia in Cuellar de Osorio acknowledged the Gov-
ernment’s concern with the practicality of the law.75 Specifically, the Govern-
ment contended that the logistics of implementing these changes within an al-
ready cumbersome and overly complicated immigration system makes the 
statute impracticable to the point of ambiguity.76 Judge Murguia concluded, 
however, that neither a change in policy—even if difficult to implement—nor 
unresolved procedural questions make the statute impracticable.77 
While Judge Murguia did not undertake an analysis of the legislative his-
tory in her opinion, such an analysis would have been useful for the Ninth Cir-
cuit to consider, and the Supreme Court should consider it in its deliberations, 
particularly in light of the amicus brief submitted by a bipartisan group of con-
gressmen who voted for the CSPA.78 The CSPA passed both houses of Con-
gress by unanimous vote, even after the addition of an amendment in the Sen-
ate, which expanded the scope of the bill.79 The legislative history demon-
                                                                                                                           
tion of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law . . . the extent of 
judicial review of the agency’s policy determinations is limited.”), with Dole v. United Steelworkers 
of America, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (“‘[I]n expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sen-
tence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and poli-
cy.’”) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)). 
 71 See Zhang v. Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919–20 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (deferring to the BIA 
and rejecting the plaintiffs’ appeal), aff’d sub nom. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, (9th 
Cir. 2011), and rev’d en banc, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013) 
(No. 12-930) (argued Dec. 13, 2013). 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. at 921. 
 74 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012–16. 
 75 See id. at 1013–15. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, supra note 1, at 1 (“To promote . . . goals [of preserving family unity] . . . [Congress] 
crafted the CSPA to protect all children who seek to immigrate . . . from the consequences of ‘aging 
out.’”); see also Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1013–14 (holding that no language of the CSPA indi-
cates that Congress intended for the identity of the petitioner to be relevant, nor that the drafters had 
envisioned a system involving more than one petitioner); 148 Cong. Rec. H4991 (daily ed. Jul. 22, 
2002) (statements of Rep. Sensenbrenner and Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“The Child Status Protection Act 
. . . is the culmination of a bipartisan agreement of both the House and the Senate . . .”). 
 79 See Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, supra note 1, at 6–7 (noting that CSPA met with overwhelming bipartisan support and 
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strates that the BIA interpreted the statute contrary to Congress’s intent, which 
was to protect all families with aged-out children.80 This misinterpretation on 
the part of the BIA demonstrates the importance of the Ninth Circuit’s role in 
affirming the intent of the legislation.81 This decision reaffirms the judicial role 
of interpreting the law as written by Congress, while leaving to the executive 
agency the task of proper implementation of that law.82 
The Supreme Court should affirm Judge Murguia’s holding that the stat-
ute’s plain language conveys Congress’s unambiguous intent to provide all 
aged-out derivative beneficiaries with automatic conversion of their petition 
and retention of their original priority date.83 The Court should further affirm 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that statutory provisions must be read in con-
text.84 This sets important precedent for courts faced with interpreting complex 
statutes that represent Congress’s efforts to craft legislation that extends rights 
to marginalized populations, particularly in the area of immigration.85 As the 
debate over reform of the U.S. immigration system continues in Congress, any 
resulting legislation will almost certainly be highly complex and embody com-
promises between competing interests.86 Without oversight by the courts, 
USCIS and other executive agencies will determine how and to what extent 
any protections passed by Congress are implemented.87 This would leave the 
                                                                                                                           
passed both houses before and after amendments with unanimous votes); 148 Cong. Rec. H4992 
(2002) (unanimous vote to suspend the rules and pass the Senate amendment). 
 80 See 148 Cong. Rec. H4991 (daily ed. Jul. 22, 2002) (statements of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“This 
bill is a fine example of how we and the other body can work together in a collaborative fashion. 
Bringing families together is a prime goal of our immigration system. H.R. 1209 facilitates and has-
tens the reuniting of legal immigrants’ families.”). 
 81 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1013; Merrill, supra note 15, at 996–97 (noting that judicial 
review is the only meaningful check on agency power); Slocum, supra note 17, at 512 (describing 
how the judiciary fights back against anti-immigrant legislation and agency action); Sunstein, supra 
note 15, at 527–28 (stating that judicial review serves as an important shield against irrational agency 
behavior). 
 82 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012–16. 
 83 Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1015–16. 
 84 See id. at 1012. 
 85 See id. at 1009 (“The BIA . . . concluded that ‘there is no indication in the . . . legislative histo-
ry of the CSPA that Congress intended to create a mechanism to avoid the . . . consequence of a child 
aging out of a visa category because of the length of the visa line.’” (quoting In re Wang, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 28, 38 (BIA 2009))); 148 Cong. Rec. H4991 (2002); see also Slocum, supra note 17, at 527 
(stating that when extreme deference is given to immigration agencies, it allows the executive branch 
to easily circumvent the actual law). 
 86 See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the Dream Act and the Legislative Process: A 
Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1757, 1789 (2009) (noting 
that the legislative process for immigration reform involves complex and interlocking issues of vary-
ing coalitions). 
 87 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 55–56; Slocum, supra note 17, at 513–14 (arguing 
that the executive branch has taken great liberties with immigration legislation that the judiciary has 
sought to check through preservation of judicial review). 
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lives of too many people vulnerable to the whims of an ever-changing execu-
tive branch.88 
Holding the language as written to be unambiguous does not usurp 
USCIS’s prerogative to determine immigration policy.89 Rather, it affirms the 
role of the courts to interpret immigration law that has been set down by Con-
gress, and holds USCIS to its obligation to faithfully execute the protections 
that Congress has deemed necessary.90 In the absence of a decision affirming 
the Ninth Circuit, immigrants who waited more than ten years to legally enter 
the United States would be forced to restart the process simply because no 
USCIS classification previously existed to accommodate these families and the 
Agency is unwilling to modify its procedures to do so.91 Such a ruling would 
allow the BIA to impermissibly ignore the unanimous decision of Congress to 
protect families that have waited years to immigrate together to the United 
States.92 
CONCLUSION 
In Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, re-
versed the district court and a precedential decision by the BIA when it found 
that the CSPA unambiguously extended automatic conversion and priority date 
retention to all derivate beneficiaries who age out while waiting for their visas 
to become available. The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part Chevron test to its 
review of the BIA’s decision. In her step one analysis, Judge Murguia engaged 
in a plain text reading of the statute and found the language to be unambigu-
ous. She bolstered her analysis by using standard tools of statutory construc-
tion to hold that the language of the statute, when read in context, extends the 
protections of the CSPA to the appellants’ children and to all aged-out deriva-
tive beneficiaries. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in De-
cember 2013. The Court should now follow the reasoning laid out in the Ninth 
Circuit majority opinion and find the statute to unambiguously grant its protec-
tion to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries. The Court should exercise its re-
sponsibility to say “what the law is” and should reject the executive branch’s 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermin-
ing Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 833–35 (stating that following Sep-
tember 11, 2001 the Justice Department began streamlining administrative review and attempting to 
circumvent judicial review, resulting in an erosion of immigrant rights); Slocum, supra note 17, at 514 
(describing the high number of immigrants deported since the executive branch implemented expedit-
ed administrative review). 
 89 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177; Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011–14. 
 90 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177; Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011–14. 
 91 See Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010, 1013. 
 92 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 16–17. 
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effort to reinterpret the CSPA contrary to the clear intent of Congress. Robust 
judicial review is essential to the survival of hard-fought, complex legislation 
common in the field of immigration. The Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit 
and preserve the rights that Congress has provided to immigrant families. 
